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Abstract
Introduction: On June 29, 2012, mid-Atlantic storms resulted in a large-scale power
outage affecting up to three million people across multiple (US) states. Hemodialysis
centers are dependent on electricity to provide dialysis care to end-stage renal disease
patients. The objective of this study was to determine how the power outage impacted
operations in a sample of hemodialysis centers in the impacted regions.
Methods: The sample consisted of all hemodialysis centers located in the District of
Columbia and a total of ﬁve counties with the largest power losses in West Virginia,
Virginia, and Maryland. A semi-structured interview guide was developed, and the charge
nurse or supervisor in each facility was interviewed. The survey questions addressed
whether their centers lost power, if so, for how long, where their patients received dialysis,
whether their centers had backup generators, and if so, whether they had any problems
operating them, and whether their center received patients from other centers if they
had power.
Results: Calls were placed to 90 dialysis centers in the sampled areas and a 90% response
rate was achieved. Overall, hemodialysis operations at approximately 30% (n 5 24) of the
centers queried were impacted by the power outage. Of the 36 centers that lost power,
31% (n 5 11) referred their patients to other dialysis centers, 22% (n 5 8) accommodated
their patients during a later shift or on a different day; the rest of the centers either
experienced brief power outages that did not affect operations or experienced a power
outage on days that the center is usually closed. Some centers in the study cohort reported
receiving patients from other centers for dialysis 33% (n 5 27). Thirty-two percent
(n 5 26) of the centers queried had backup generators on site. Eleven percent (n 5 4) of
the centers experiencing power outages reported that backup generators were brought in
by their parent companies.
Conclusions: Comprehensive emergency planning for dialysis centers should include
provisions for having backup generators on site, having plans in place for the timely
delivery of a generator during a power outage, or having predesignated backup dialysis
centers for patients to receive dialysis during emergencies. Most dialysis centers surveyed
in this study were able to sustain continuity of care by implementing such pre-existing
emergency plans.
Abir M, Jan S, Jubelt L, Merchant R, Lurie N. The impact of a large-scale power
outage on hemodialysis center operations. Prehosp Disaster Med. 2013;28(6):543-546.

Introduction
Chronically ill patients are often vulnerable to disruptions in health care delivery during
emergencies, resulting in problems accessing vital medications or treatments.1 End-stage
renal disease patients are especially sensitive to interruptions in dialysis.2 Emergency
preparedness planning by hemodialysis centers, providers, and patients can help decrease
interruptions in care and may decrease adverse outcomes in this population during and in
the aftermath of such events.2
On June 29, 2012, a line of some of the most destructive thunderstorms in the history
of North America affected a vast area in the Midwest and Mid-Atlantic regions of the
US, resulting in 22 deaths and close to 4.2 million households losing power.3
Prior studies have demonstrated the challenges of providing hemodialysis in the
aftermath of disasters such as hurricanes4,5 and earthquakes.6 For example, Hurricane
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Power Outages and Hemodialysis Center Operations

Experienced Power Outage
n 5 36 Centers
No. (%)

Power Maintained
n 5 45 Centers
No. (%)

13 (36)

Not applicable

13-24 hours

9 (25)

Not applicable

.24 hours

12 (33)

Not applicable

2 (6)

Not applicable

11 (31)

Not applicable

8 (22)

19 (42)

Yes

10 (28)

16 (36)

No

25 (69)

28 (62)

Power outage
12 hours or less

Unknown
Sent patients to other units for dialysis
Received patients from other centers
Backup generator on site

Unknown

1 (3)

1 (2)
Abir & 2013 Prehospital and Disaster Medicine

Table 1. Power Status of Hemodialysis Centers Affected by the 2012 Mid-Atlantic Storms

Katrina caused structural destruction, ﬂooding, loss of power and
water, and problems with transportation; an estimated 44% of
hemodialysis patients missed one or more dialysis sessions,
compared to a 5%-9% miss rate during non-disaster periods.7
Several studies have examined the impact of power outages,
including the 2003 power outage in the northeastern United States
and Canada, on health more generally.8 These studies documented
an increase in accidental deaths and injuries,9,10 food poisoning,11
hospitalizations for respiratory disease,12 hypothermia,9 and nonaccidental disease-related mortality8 during blackouts.
Previous large-scale blackouts, including the power outage in
New York City in 1965, led to a New York State mandate that
required all hospitals and long-term care facilities to have backup
generators.13,14 A 2009 assessment of hospitals in New York
State indicated that all hospitals had backup generators.15 In
addition to hospitals and long-term care facilities, hemodialysis
centers are reliant on electricity and clean water to provide the
needed services to their patients. Several states have passed
legislation requiring that all dialysis centers have backup generators
in order to ensure continuity of care for their patients during power
outages.16,17 However, many states have been reluctant to enact
such legislation, and there is no federal requirement that they have
backup power.
In this study, a sample of dialysis centers affected by the June
2012 mid-Atlantic storms were surveyed to determine how their
operations were affected.
Methods
The study sample consisted of all hemodialysis centers located in
all of the District of Columbia and in the ﬁve counties with the
greatest numbers of reported power outages across West Virginia,
Virginia, and Maryland. The charge nurse or supervisor in each
facility was interviewed via telephone.
A semi-structured interview guide was developed based on
literature review and on the clinical experience of one of the
Prehospital and Disaster Medicine

authors (MA) in caring for patients presenting to the emergency
department for dialysis after the storm. The survey questions
addressed whether their centers lost power, if so, for how long,
where their patients received dialysis, whether their centers had
backup generators, and if so, whether they had any problems
operating them, and whether their center received any patients
from other dialysis centers if they had power.
Four authors (MA, SC, RM, SJ) independently reviewed the
interview notes and identiﬁed central emerging themes.
The RAND Corporation’s Internal Review Board (IRB)
deemed that the study protocol did not involve human subjects,
hence did not require IRB review.
Results
Calls were placed to all 90 dialysis centers in the sampled areas;
the response rate was 90%. Three centers declined to participate,
ﬁve either did not answer the phone or did not return calls, and
one was a home dialysis service.
The results of the study are summarized in Table 1. Overall,
approximately 30% (n 5 24) of all the dialysis centers queried
were impacted by the power outage, as deﬁned by those that had
to have patients return for dialysis during a different shift or on a
different day, those that had to send their patients to different
dialysis centers, those that had to have backup generators brought
in, and those that had problems operationalizing their on-site
backup generators.
Of the 36 centers that lost power 36% (n 5 13) experienced a
power loss of 12 hours or less, 25% (n 5 9) experienced a power
loss of 13-24 hours, 33% (n 5 12) experienced a power loss for
greater than 24 hours, and six percent (n 5 2) experienced a
power loss for an unknown length of time.
Of the 36 centers that lost power, 31% (n 5 11) referred their
patients to other dialysis centers, 22% (n 5 8) accommodated
their patients during a later shift or on a different day, and the
rest of the centers either experienced brief power outages that did
Vol. 28, No. 6
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not affect operations or experienced a power outage on days that
the center is usually closed. Twenty-two percent (n 5 8) of the
centers that experienced a power outage received patients from
other centers after their power was restored, and 42% (n 5 19)
of the centers that maintained power received patients from
other centers. Some dialysis centers in the study cohort reported
receiving patients from other centers for dialysis (33%, n 5 27);
approximately four percent (n 5 3) of centers reported receiving
such requests but were unable to accommodate patients due to
inadequate space or stafﬁng. One center indicated that it had staff
from other centers come into their facility on a third shift to
dialyze their own patients.
Of the centers that experienced a power outage 28% (n 5 10)
had generators on site. Thirty-six percent (n 5 16) of the centers
that maintained power had generators on site. Of the centers that
had generators on site, only one center reported that its staff was
unable to operate the generator on the day of the power outage.
Eleven percent (n 5 4) of the centers that experienced a power
outage reported that backup generators were brought in by their
parent companies, and 17% (n 5 6) reported that they could have
accessed one if needed. Of note, the four centers that had a
backup generator brought in each experienced at least one day of
delay before the generator arrived.
Additionally, some centers volunteered that they had difﬁculty
contacting patients by phone to refer them to other centers due to
the power outage. Respondents also indicated that although they
arranged for their patients to be dialyzed at alternate sites, some
patients inquired about why they could not present to nearby
emergency departments to receive dialysis, citing the distance
from their homes to the alternate centers and problems with
transportation as barriers to receiving dialysis at those locations.
Discussion
Dialysis facilities were queried in a sample of areas affected by the
2012 mid-Atlantic storm to determine the challenges a natural
disaster presents to dialysis center operations. Thirty percent of
the dialysis centers queried reported that care at their centers was
impacted by the storm. Although respondents at these impacted
dialysis centers used common-sense coping mechanisms to
ensure their patients were dialyzed, some challenges experienced
by the different dialysis centers were identiﬁed.
Many centers had previous agreements with partner facilities
to dialyze their patients in the event of an emergency. However,
some patients did not present for their rescheduled dialysis visits,
some centers could not contact their patients by phone to refer
them to the alternate centers, and some patients complained
about the backup centers being too far away to access. A few
centers in this study reported requests to accommodate patients
from centers with power outages, but they were unable to
accommodate them due to space or stafﬁng shortages. One center
reported that it had the staff and patients from another facility
come in during a third shift for dialysis.
The results of this study indicate that even centers with
backup generators may have problems operating these units,
highlighting the importance of regular maintenance of, and staff
familiarity with, backup generators. For centers that rely on
generators being brought in as needed during power outages,
having plans in place ensuring that these units are delivered in a
timely manner is critical. For dialysis centers that have
agreements with partner facilities to have their patients dialyzed
at that center in case of emergencies, ensuring that the receiving
December 2013
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facility has the stafﬁng and space needed to accommodate an
increase in patient load is important.
The study ﬁndings, including the challenges and coping
strategies reported, highlight the importance of emergency
planning for dialysis facilities and their patients. A number of
existing resources may help inform benchmarks for emergency
planning for hemodialysis centers and patients with chronic renal
insufﬁciency. The Renal Disaster Relief Task Force (RDRTF) of
the International Society of Nephrology provides dialysis services
in the aftermath of disasters.18 Additionally, the RDRTF has
conducted post-disaster analysis of acute care, hospital-based
care, and chronic care, and has made recommendations to
improve disaster preparedness and response as it pertains to
dialysis providers and patients.19 A review of recommendations
from this task force can help inform and improve disaster
planning for patients and dialysis centers. The Kidney Community
Emergency Response Coalition (KCERC), with representation
from all aspects of the dialysis community and federal partners in
the United States, has developed a disaster plan focused on the
needs of dialysis patients in the aftermath of disaster at both local
and national levels.20 The resources and programs developed by
this coalition can be informative in improving emergency planning
for dialysis patients and facilities.
Past disasters, including hurricanes Katrina and Rita, have
been informative regarding the need for and various methods of
emergency preparedness for hemodialysis centers and patients
with chronic renal insufﬁciency. Unlike the 2012 mid-Atlantic
storms, the aftermath of these hurricanes was not only marked by
the loss of utility, but by structural destruction, ﬂooding, and
problems with transportation.21 The current study sheds light on
aspects of emergency preparedness pertinent to scenarios where
dialysis centers experience a power loss in the absence of
signiﬁcant structural damage or barriers to patient transportation
to centers for dialysis.
Strategies for emergency preparedness for dialysis patients
have previously been described using an all-hazards approach to
help reduce or prevent adverse effects on this population,
including patient and provider education, developing and
reviewing personal disaster plans with patients, and public service
announcements during and in the aftermath of disasters.19 While
dialysis centers are required to devise and implement emergency
plans for patients and their facilities as per the US Medicare
Conditions for Coverage,22 backup power is not an explicit
requirement.
A recent study evaluating the effect of the 2003 large-scale
power outage on health care systems in New York City concluded
that disaster planning could greatly beneﬁt from non-acute health
care facilities having backup generators.23 Some states, including
New Jersey and Maine, have legislation in place requiring dialysis
centers to have backup generators on site.16,17 Other states have
approached emergency planning requirements for dialysis centers
differently. In 2011, Maryland passed legislation requiring
dialysis centers to have emergency plans that include continuity
of operations procedures that would ensure patient access to
dialysis services.24 This law, however, does not mandate dialysis
centers have generators on site. In the aftermath of Hurricanes
Rita, Ike and Gustav, Texas passed legislation with a tiered
requirement that mandates centers to have either onsite
generators or contracts for portable generators, unless they have
an agreement with another facility within a 100-mile radius to
provide emergency contingency care to their patients.25
Prehospital and Disaster Medicine
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This study also sheds light on the challenges and needs for data
collection during or in the immediate aftermath of emergencies.
Fortunately, an Internal Review Board (IRB) was able to review
the protocol for this study and make a determination within
48 hours, but this is often not the case, even with simple protocols
such as this. Similarly, this study was conducted with no external
funding; had funding been needed, the time required to ﬁnd, apply
and receive an award likely would have been beyond a reasonable
recall period for the staff interviewed, compromising the quality of
the information obtained.
Limitations
This study has several limitations. First, calls to the dialysis centers
were made two to three weeks after most centers experienced a
power outage, hence responses were subject to recall bias.
However, there are currently no systems in place to collect data
rapidly from various health care organizations in the immediate
aftermath of disasters. Second, there may have been some
variability in knowledge of the individuals to whom the questions
were directed across dialysis centers, although in every case the unit
supervisor was sought in order to conduct the study. Third, the
study survey interview guide was not validated prior to the study.
Fourth, some of the data collected was volunteered by some of the
facilities and not formally collected as part of the study, hence may
not be representative of the experience of the surveyed centers
on the whole. Finally, this study did not determine whether powerrelated issues at dialysis facilities had any effect on patient outcome.
Although ideal, adding such level of detail for a time-sensitive
study such as this may have presented signiﬁcant challenges to the
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continuity of care by implementing pre-existing emergency
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include provisions for having backup generators on site, having
plans in place for the timely delivery of a generator during a
power outage, or having predesignated backup dialysis centers
for patients that both the center leadership and patients are
informed about. Considering the paucity of literature addressing
best practices regarding dialysis center preparedness, this and
future studies can help inform states considering implementing
related policy.
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